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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Reynaldo Rivera-Cruz appeals an order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
denying his motion for a sentence reduction. The relevant 
statute (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)) authorizes sentence 
reductions for defendants initially “sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on” a United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (USSG) range that was later lowered by the 
United States Sentencing Commission. In Koons v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 1783 (2018), the Supreme Court held that 
such relief is unavailable to a defendant whose Guidelines 
range is “scrapped” in favor of a statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence. Id. at 1787–88. We now hold that the 
same is true where, as here, a statutory maximum displaces 
the defendant’s Guidelines range.  
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I 
 Rivera-Cruz pleaded guilty to distributing and 
possessing with intent to manufacture and distribute cocaine 
hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The 
quantity of drugs involved yielded a base offense level of 32, 
see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2006), and the United States 
Probation Office recommended a two-level firearm 
enhancement and a two-level obstruction of justice 
enhancement. Based on a total offense level of 36 and a 
criminal history category of VI, Rivera-Cruz’s presentence 
report (PSR) calculated his Guidelines range as 324–405 
months’ imprisonment. Because Rivera-Cruz’s offense 
carried a statutory maximum of 240 months’ imprisonment, 
however, the PSR fixed his Guidelines range at that number. 
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); USSG §§ 1B1.1(a)(8), 
5G1.1(a). 
At Rivera-Cruz’s March 2010 sentencing hearing, the 
District Court adopted the PSR’s findings and agreed that 
“because the statutory maximum penalty is 20 years, the 
[G]uideline sentence is restricted to 240 months.” App. 122. 
The District Court then considered the Government’s motion 
for a downward departure under USSG § 5K1.1 to account 
for Rivera-Cruz’s substantial assistance to the Government. 
The Government requested a sentence of 25 months below 
the mandatory maximum, or 215 months’ imprisonment. 
After discussing the relevant factors in § 5K1.1, the District 
Court announced that it would grant the motion. In 
accordance with Third Circuit precedent, it calculated the 
extent of the departure in terms of “offense levels as opposed 
to specific quantities of time.” App. 127; see also United 
States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that, unlike a variance, a departure “change[s] the 
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Guidelines range” and thus requires the sentencing court to 
“calculate a final guideline offense level and . . . range”). The 
Court settled on a five-level departure to an offense level of 
31, noting that the Government-recommended sentence of 
215 months fell “approximately in the middle” of the 
corresponding range of 188–235 months’ imprisonment. 
App. 127. It then sentenced Rivera-Cruz to 188 months’ 
imprisonment. Rivera-Cruz unsuccessfully appealed his 
conviction and sentence. United States v. Rivera-Cruz, 401 F. 
App’x 677, 678 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Four years later, the Sentencing Commission adopted 
Guidelines Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced 
Rivera-Cruz’s base offense level by two. See USSG App. C, 
Amdt. 782 (2014); id. § 1B1.10(d); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(o). With a total offense level of 34 (consisting of a base 
offense level of 30 and the aforementioned enhancements) 
and the same criminal history category, Rivera-Cruz’s 
applicable Guidelines range would have been 262–327 
months’ imprisonment. Because of the statutory maximum, 
however, Rivera-Cruz’s Guidelines range remained fixed at 
240 months.  
In June 2016, Rivera-Cruz requested a sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 
782. In addition to requiring that a defendant’s initial 
sentence be “based on” a subsequently lowered range, 
§ 3582(c)(2) requires that a Guidelines amendment cited in 
support of a § 3582(c)(2) motion “have the effect of lowering 
the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” USSG 
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (requiring all 
sentence reductions to be “consistent with applicable policy 
statements,” including USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B)). Rivera-
Cruz acknowledged that the 240-month statutory maximum 
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supplanted his initial Guidelines range both before and after 
Amendment 782. He nevertheless argued that, in light of his 
five-level downward departure, Amendment 782 effectively 
reduced his offense level from 31 to 29, which “ha[d] the 
effect of lowering [his] applicable guideline range,” 
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), from 188–235 months’ imprisonment to 
151–188 months. And because the District Court used his 
otherwise applicable—i.e., pre-maximum—Guidelines range 
of 324–405 months’ imprisonment as a baseline for its 
downward departure, he argued, his sentence was “based on” 
a range lowered by the Sentencing Commission as required 
by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Citing the District Court’s original 
bottom-of-the-range sentence, Rivera-Cruz requested a 151-
month sentence.  
The District Court denied Rivera-Cruz’s motion. It did 
not determine whether Rivera-Cruz was initially sentenced 
“based on” a later lowered range, instead reasoning that, 
because of the statutory maximum, Amendment 782 had no 
effect on his Guidelines range. Rivera-Cruz filed this timely 
appeal.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3231 and 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and may affirm the District Court’s order “on 
any basis supported by the record.” Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We review de 
novo a district court’s determination that a defendant is 
ineligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United 
States v. Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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III 
 In this appeal, Rivera-Cruz renews his claim that he is 
eligible for a sentence reduction because the District Court 
used his Guidelines range (based on an offense level of 36) as 
a “starting point” for its downward departure, so the Court 
“actually based [his] sentence on a Guidelines sentencing 
range . . . subsequently lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission.” Rivera-Cruz Br. 12. He also argues that the 
District Court erred in determining that Amendment 782 
“ha[d] no impact on his Guidelines range.” Id. Because 
Rivera-Cruz’s first argument lacks merit, we will affirm. 
 In many cases, a defendant’s Guidelines range serves 
as the “foundation” of the ultimate sentencing decision. 
Koons, 138 S. Ct. at 1789 (citation omitted). In some cases, 
however, the Guidelines themselves “call for the ranges to be 
tossed aside.” Id. at 1788. “When that happens—when the 
range[] play[s] no relevant part in the judge’s determination 
of the defendant’s ultimate sentence—the resulting sentence 
is not ‘based on’ a Guidelines range.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2)). That’s what happened in Koons, where five 
petitioners were denied sentence reductions because their 
offenses carried a statutory minimum penalty that exceeded 
the top end of their Guidelines ranges. Id. at 1787–88.1 
Having “dropped out of the case,” the displaced Guidelines 
                                                 
1 See also USSG § 1B1.1(a)(8) (directing courts, after 
calculating a Guidelines range according to § 1B1.1(a)(1)–
(7), to apply, among other provisions, § 5G1.1(b), which in 
turn requires the calculated range to be replaced by an 
applicable mandatory minimum when the minimum exceeds 
the top of the range). 
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ranges “could not come close to forming the basis for the 
sentence that the District Court imposed.” Id. at 1788 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the 
Guidelines ranges did not play “a relevant part in the 
framework the sentencing judge used in imposing the 
sentence,” the Sentencing Commission’s subsequent decision 
to lower those ranges did not make the petitioners eligible for 
a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1788–89 
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
 Unlike Koons, this appeal involves a statutory 
maximum instead of a statutory minimum. That distinction is 
immaterial for purposes of the present inquiry, however. 
Using parallel language, the Guidelines call for a defendant’s 
initial sentencing range to be replaced with the statutory 
maximum in the same way a range is replaced by a statutory 
minimum. In both cases, USSG § 1B1.1(a)(8) instructs courts 
to apply § 5G1.1, among other provisions, after calculating an 
initial range. In turn, § 5G1.1 provides that “[w]here the 
statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the 
minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily 
authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline 
sentence,” id. § 5G1.1(a), just as it provides in the next 
paragraph that “[w]here a statutorily required minimum 
sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable 
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence 
shall be the guideline sentence,” id. § 5G1.1(b). Like a range 
that falls entirely below a statutory minimum, a range (such as 
Rivera-Cruz’s) that falls entirely above a statutory maximum 
will typically “drop[] out of the case.” Koons, 138 S. Ct. at 
1788. And once out of the case, it cannot form the basis of the 
sentence. See id.; see also United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 
152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (interpreting “sentencing range” as 
 8 
 
used in § 3582(c)(2) to refer to “the end result of the overall 
guideline calculus, not the series of tentative results 
reached . . . in the performance of that calculus” (citation 
omitted)). For that reason, Rivera-Cruz was not sentenced 
“based on” a Guidelines range that was subsequently lowered 
by the Sentencing Commission.2 
 Rivera-Cruz resists this conclusion by attempting to 
show that, notwithstanding the statutory maximum, the 
District Court based his sentence on his initial Guidelines 
range. In other words, he argues, that range did not actually 
“drop[] out of the case” after it was displaced. Koons, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1788. He emphasizes that when it departed downward 
five levels, the District Court explicitly referred to his initial 
Guidelines calculation, and that once the Court settled on a 
new range, it sentenced him to the bottom of that range—not 
the 215-month sentence the Government recommended in its 
substantial assistance motion. He concedes that if the District 
Court had instead used his statutory maximum as the starting 
point for its departure, he would be ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) 
                                                 
2 Koons also makes clear that the District Court’s 
downward departure was unrelated to Rivera-Cruz’s initial 
Guidelines range, and therefore does not serve as a basis for 
§ 3582(c)(2) eligibility. See 138 S. Ct. at 1789. A court’s 
consideration of a substantial assistance motion is based not 
on the initial Guidelines range, but rather on the court’s 
evaluation of the defendant’s assistance. Id.; see 
§ 5K1.1(a)(1)–(5) (listing factors a court may consider, 
including “the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s 
assistance” and the “truthfulness, completeness, and 
reliability of any information or testimony provided”).  
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relief. But he claims “that’s not this case.” Rivera-Cruz 
Br. 15.  
 We do not share Rivera-Cruz’s interpretation of the 
District Court’s decisionmaking process. The District Court 
did return to Rivera-Cruz’s initial Guidelines calculation 
before announcing its sentencing decision. But it did so for a 
limited purpose: to determine the number of offense levels by 
which to depart downward. By necessity, that determination 
began with Rivera-Cruz’s initial offense level. But the 
District Court explained that its decision to express Rivera-
Cruz’s departure in terms of offense levels—rather than 
simply departing from the statutory maximum by a certain 
number of months—was based on this Court’s precedent, not 
a reconsideration of Rivera-Cruz’s initial Guidelines range. 
Indeed, the District Court noted that its downward departure 
aligned with the Government’s recommendation of 215 
months’ imprisonment, which fell near the midpoint of 
Rivera-Cruz’s new range. The Government’s 215-month 
recommendation, in turn, was based expressly on the 240-
month statutory maximum. Rivera-Cruz’s initial Guidelines 
range thus did not figure substantively into the District 
Court’s departure determination. Consequently, the Court’s 
ultimate decision to sentence Rivera-Cruz to 188 months’ 
imprisonment—the bottom of his post-departure range—is 
equally untethered from his initial Guidelines calculation. In 
context, therefore, the District Court’s reference to Rivera-
Cruz’s initial Guidelines range did not revive it as “a relevant 
part [of] the framework” governing the sentencing decision. 
Koons, 138 S. Ct. at 1788.  
For these reasons, Rivera-Cruz’s sentence was not 
“based on” his initial Guidelines range, and the Sentencing 
Commission’s lowering of that range by Amendment 782 did 
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not make Rivera-Cruz eligible for a sentence reduction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because the statute precludes relief 
where a sentence is not “based on” a lowered Guidelines 
range, we need not resolve, as the District Court did, whether 
Amendment 782 “ha[d] the effect of lowering” Rivera-Cruz’s 
“applicable guideline range.” USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  
* * * 
 Like the petitioners in Koons, Rivera-Cruz received a 
sentence “based on” a statutory requirement, not on a 
Guidelines range that was later lowered by the United States 
Sentencing Commission. Rivera-Cruz was therefore ineligible 
for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
